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THE ARMENIAN GENOCIDE AS A DUAL
PROBLEM OF NATIONAL AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW
VAHAKN N. DADRIAN*

I. THE ARMENIAN GENOCIDE AS A PROBLEM OF
NATIONAL LAW
A.

INTRODUCTION

The Armenian Genocide (1915-1916) is significant for having been the
first major genocide of the twentieth century. Equally significant is the fact
that, for more than eight decades, its occurrence has been denied by
successive Turkish governments with defiance and often truculence. The
conditions which helped create and sustain this culture of denial deserve
special attention for they demonstrate how easily a nation can shift gears
and reverse its position. Indeed, in the immediate aftermath of World War I,
as the Ottoman Empire lay defeated and prostrate, the Turkish government,
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last twenty years he has lectured extensively in French, English and German in such institutions as
the Free University of Berlin and the Universities of Munich, Parma, Torino, Ztrich, Uppsala,
Frankfurt am Main, Cologne, Bochum, Mtinster, Amsterdam, Utrecht, Geneva, Brussels,
UNESCO's Paris center, and the U.N. in New York under the sponsorship of the Permanent
Missions of Armenia and Rwanda. His book, The History of the Armenian Genocide: Ethnic
Conflict from the Balkans to Anatolia to the Caucasus, was first published in 1995, has since
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Armenian Genocide. Professor Dadrian has been Director of Genocide Research at the Zoryan
Institute since 1999.
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media, and general public, were driven by a spirit of guilt over the wartime
deportations and massacres of the Armenians. A sense of apprehension
about the consequences of the crimes was often accompanied by a sense of
guilt and contrition.
Without much exaggeration, one may state that this state of gloom and
doom did not differ much from that prevalent in Germany in the aftermath
of World War II. But, unlike the case of moribund Nazi Germany, defeated
Turkey's misfortune did not last very long. In post-war Istanbul, unlike in
Nuremberg, the victorious Allies began to bicker among themselves for
spoils and competing colonialists designs. The result was an almost
crippling disunity on matters involving the punitive treatment of defeated
Turkey. Through a dynamic insurgency deep in Anatolia, the emerging
Kemalist movement succeeded in exploiting these discords, and, within a
relatively short span of time, transformed a devastating military defeat into
a spectacular military victory. The ultimate result was the rise of an
assertive new Republic of Turkey, which fostered a new political culture
marked by an abrupt dissociation from the legacy of the preceding Sultan's
regime. The cultivation of a collective amnesia and denial of the Armenian
Genocide is intimately related with this posture.
The period between the end of World War I and the onset of the
Kemalist movement is, therefore, a unique period. The Turkish Republic's
subsequent denial of the Armenian Genocide highlights the import of a
study of the pre-denial official Turkish record of acknowledging,
documenting, and prosecuting the centrally organized mass murder of the
Armenians of the Ottoman Empire. It is indeed a record that, by its very
nature and compass, may serve to dismantle the entire edifice of the Turkish
culture of denial.
B. HERALDING THE CHARGE OF "CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY"

In the immediate aftermath of the war, the highest authorities identified
with the post-war Turkish Government, raised their voices to severely
condemn the wartime treatment of the Armenians. In doing so, they
remarkably used the term "crimes against humanity." The Sultan, the
highest authority, for example, used exactly these words when denouncing
the crime (Kanuni insaniyete karai ika edilen ceraim).' When introducing a
motion in the parliament for the purpose of launching an investigation of
such crimes committed during the war, deputy Fuad, referring to the
atrocities involved, invoked the principle of "the rules of humanity"
(kavaidi insaniye).2 The preeminent Turkish statesman, Re~it Akif, the first

1.

AlI FUAD TORKGELDI, GOROP I$ITTIKLERIM 194 (1959).

2. OSMAN SELIM KOCAHANOOLU,
YARGLANMASi 52 (Istanbul 1918).
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post-war president of the Council of State, a supreme Ottoman judicial
organ, in his speech in the Senate on November 21, 1918, likewise invoked
"the world's sense of humanity" (cihani insaniyeti) when decrying the
massacres perpetrated against the Armenians.' In the Yozgat Court-Martial
verdict, the condemned perpetrators of the Armenian massacres were
accused of having violated the principle of "human sentiment" (hissiyatt
insaniye)' Another senator, Damad Ferit, who four months later became
Grand Vizier, i.e., Prime Minister, on the same day, described the
massacres as a type of atrocity which makes "humanity and the civilized
world shudder, and shudder forever." As to Senator Ahmet Riza, the
president of that body, he on the same day proposed to launch through the
offices of the Public Prosecutor a criminal investigation of these series of
crimes "which remain unprecedented (emsali gelrilmedik) in the annals of
Ottoman history."5
The significance of these decrials is that they exude a transnational, i.e.,
universal, ethos in the overall conception of criminal justice which
presently was, as will be seen later, administered strictly in terms of
Ottoman national rather than, international, penal codes. But they helped
serve the broader parameters of such justice. What stands out here is that
the authorities, identified with all three branches of the Turkish
government, the executive, legislative, and judicial, resolved to prosecute
and punish the authors of the wartime mass murder.
C. THE STIRRINGS IN THE PARLIAMENT

The members of both houses of that body initially were but jolted by
these developments. The partisans of the defeated and dislodged CUP
power-wielders, in particular the deputies of the Lower House, were at the
same time bewildered and defiant but also anxious. Notwithstanding, three
prominent members of the upper chamber of the parliament took the
initiative spearheading the condemnation of the massacres in question. In
doing so they were pursuing the ways and means to prosecute and punish
the perpetrators involved. Foremost among them was the above mentioned
Ahmet Riza, the newly appointed president of the Senate. In his inaugural
speech on November 19, 1918 he castigated the massacres by denouncing
them as "savage" acts (vah~iyane). When two days later he was challenged
by another senator, a retired general, who said the Armenians also
committed massacres, Riza explained the difference. He argued that the

3.

Meclisi Ayan Zabit Ceridesi [Transcripts of the Proceedings of the Ottoman Senate],

Ottoman S. 11 th Sitting 123 (1918).
4. Takvimi Vekhyi [Ottoman Parliament's Official Record Supplements covering the
proceedings of the courts-martial], no. 3617, 1 (1919).
5. Meclisi Ayan Zabit Ceridesi [Tr. of the Proceedings of the Ottoman S.1 at 117, 122,
Ottoman S. 11 th Sitting 123 (1918).
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Armenians acted as individuals, and in retaliation for the antecedent
empire-wide Armenian massacres. But he underscored the fact that, in
contrast, they, the Armenians, were killed in a sweep on "political" grounds
involving the application of an "official" (resmi), i.e., state, policy.6
On December 2, 1918, retired General (irilksilii Mahmut, a former
veteran cabinet minister, declared in the same Senate that the massacres
were ordered by the ruling Committee of Union Progress Party (CUP) and
that they were organized in Trabzon province, for example, by GovernorGeneral Cemal Azmi.7
In the Chamber of Deputies, the lower chamber of the parliament, the
statement of deputy Hafiz Mehmet, is most noteworthy as it comes from an
eyewitness who perchance was also a high ranking government official. In
his speech delivered on December 11, this deputy publicly declared that he
"personally" witnessed one of the series of drowning operations on the
Black Sea coast, at the port city of Ordu. He related that the province's
governor loaded the Armenian victims into a barge; they then were taken to
the high seas and thrown overboard. He further declared that these
drowning operations were carried out throughout province by the order of
Governor-General Cemal Azmi.8
D. THE OFFICIAL PARLIAMENTARY INVESTIGATIONS
In an effort to mitigate the pressures resulting from a commonly felt
need to initiate prosecution against the authors of the Armenian Genocide,
the leaders of the Parliament began to consider launching a series of formal
investigations. Their common goal was to eventually institute criminal
proceedings. But there were certain procedural rules to abide by in this
regard.
1.

In the Senate

After several sessions of debate, the Senators decided to create, beyond
the existing regular committees, a Special Committee (Enciimeni Mahsus),
to formally open an investigation of the misdeeds of the previous wartime
authorities. Described formally, these misdeeds included "assaults"
(tacaviiz) and "shameful acts" (fezayih). It is most significant to note here
that when condemning the same atrocities against the Armenians, Mustafa
Kemal Atattirk, the co-founder of the modern Republic of Turkey, used just
6. Meclisi Ayan Zabit Ceridesi [Tr. of the Proceedings of the Ottoman Senate], at 8,
Ottoman S. 2nd Sitting (1918); Meclisi Ayan Zabit Ceridesi [Tr. of the Proceedings of the

Ottoman S.] at 28-29, Ottoman S. 3rd Sitting (1918).
7.

Meclisi Ayan Zabit Ceridesi [Tr. of the Proceedings of the Ottoman S.] at 148, Ottoman

S. 13th Sitting (1918).
8.

Meclisi Ayan Zabit Ceridesi [Tr. of the Proceedings of the Ottoman S.] at 299, Ottoman

S. 24th Sitting (1918).
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about the same word, i.e., fazahat.9 When the committee completed its
work, it denounced in Article 10 of its final report the perpetration of
"terrible crimes" as it invoked "the basic principle of the laws of humanity"
(insanligin esas hukuk kaidelerine), which it said, the targeted perpetrators
had violated.'I
2. In the Chamber of Deputies
The residual power of the Senate did not go beyond a mere
investigation; at best it could transmit its recommendations to the Chamber
of Deputies for further action. The Chamber of Deputies had, however,
constitutional legislative power to apply concrete and specific punitive
measures against those perpetrators who were either Cabinet Ministers or
Deputies. Accordingly, in line with statutory provisions, it constituted its
Fifth Investigative Committee to launch formal inquiry into the respective
misdeeds of these high ranking officials. Nearly all wartime cabinet
ministers plus two 5;eyhulislams, the highest religious authorities of the
Empire, were subjected to prolonged interrogations by the approximately
25 members of that investigative body. Some stark revelations occurred in
the course of these interrogations, which predicated on a list of ten
questions that deputy Fuad had submitted on November 4, 1918. These
revelations mainly resulted from answering two of the ten questions which
directly and indirectly dealt with the wartime Armenian deportations and
massacres.
Of foremost significance were the responses given by two officials. ExJustice Minister Ibrahim revealed, for example, that he was ordered by War
Minister Enver to release from the prisons of the Empire "a sizeable"
number of convicts (miihim bir yekiina balig) under the pretext of engaging
them for front-line duties. It turned out, however, that these men were used
for extra-military duties, i.e., massacring the Armenians. 1" Equally, if not
more, significant were the revelations of wartime Grand Vizier, Said Halim
Papa. He told the committee members that his cabinet had authorized only
the deportation of the Armenians but that this order was misused to convert
it into an order for "killing."' 2 He further revealed that when he learned of
the atrocities against the Armenians, as Grand Vizier, he demanded an
explanation from the War Minister. But his subordinate dared to defy and

9.

MUSTAFA KEMAL ATATORK, 1 ATATORK'f0N SOYLEV VE DEMECLERI 49 (Istanbul

1945). The statement was made on April 24, 1920, on the occasion of the inauguration of the first
parliament of the modem Republic of Turkey.
10. Necmeddin Sahir Silan, Ikinci Merutiyette Divan, Ali Hareketleri, 6 TARIH KONU$UYOR
34, 2836 (1966).
11. Vahakn N. Dadrian, The Law Allowing Convicts to Enroll in the Special Organization, 22
J. POL. & MIL. SOC. 1, 57-62 (1994).

12. KOCAHANOOLU, supra note 2 at 82.
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ignore him.3

These findings, carefully collected, recorded, and filed, failed to serve
their actual purposes, however. They were meant to be submitted for
consideration and judgment to the entire body of the Chamber for further
processing. The ultimate goal was the final adjudication of the case through
the constitutionally stipulated authority of the High Council (Divani Ali).
But the abrupt dissolving of that Chamber by the Sultan on December 21,
1918, aborted the consummation of that final stage of projected
punishment.
3.

The Military Tribunal and the Courts-Martial

In launching the post-war Turkish efforts to effectively deal with the
criminality of the problem of wartime Armenian deportations and
massacres, the transition from legislative to executive initiative, proved far
more productive. The goals of retributive justice via the channels of
administration of criminal justice seemed to be more viable. Here, a
combinative interplay of executive and judicial authority was a potent force
to streamline the requisite operations. The Cabinet, often supported by the
Sultan, the highest executive authority, synchronized its authority with that
of the judiciary to prepare the groundwork for the investigation and
prosecution of the twin crimes of "deportation and massacres" (tehcir ve
taktil). Thus, within weeks after the onset of the Armistice, the political, but
more particularly, the legal, preconditions were met for instituting criminal
proceedings against a whole gamut of perpetrators.
The ministries of the Interior and Justice were mobilized for the task.
In addition, the military authorities, headed by the Ministry of Defense and
its immediate representative in the Ottoman capital, the military
commandant (muhafiz), joined in this complex task. The resulting division
of labor embraced two major levels of activity: pre-trial and trial-related.
a.

The Pre-trialInvestigations

The central issue for the post-war Turkish government was not to
determine if the set of crimes of organized mass murder was indeed
committed, but rather how to prosecute the crime the evidence of which
was rather ubiquitous. Following the rules of Ottoman criminal procedures,
the authorities in the Justice and Interior ministries decided to institute a
major Inquiry Commission in order to conduct the requisite pre-trial
investigation. It bore the name of its head, namely, it was called the
Mazhar Inquiry Commission. For about five weeks this commission,
equipped with extensive powers, including subpoena, detention, and arrest,
undertook a massive, multi-layered, and systematic investigation with the
13. Id., at 84.
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help of many support personnel identified as judicial police and examining
magistrates. Its investigative arms extended beyond Istanbul, then the
Ottoman Empire's capital, and reached into nearly all comers of the
Empire. The evidence thus gathered was classified and catalogued. In midJanuary 1919, the Commission was able to supply to the Court Martial
some 200 files arranged by such categories as 4 locus of the crime, the
persons targeted for trial, and the type of charges.'
As anticipated, the authorities concerned determined at the end that
there was enough evidence to warrant the institution of a criminal trial and
to proceed accordingly.
b.

The Establishmentof the Courts-Martial

A number of successive Imperial Rescripts (Irade), as required by
Ottoman law, authorized the formation of Courts Martial that would be
designated as Extraordinary or Special (Fevkdlade). Initially, it was
designed to have panels of three high-ranking military officers and two
civilian judicial officials but within months the whole panel became
militarized. In its key indictment the court proposed to prosecute the crimes
of "deportation and massacres." However, it added "profiteering" (ihtikdir)
in order to underscore the economic underpinnings of the crime, including
personal greed.
What is so remarkable about this key indictment is that it was
embedded with more than forty official, semi-official, and regular
documents appended to the text of that instrument. It contained, among
others, twelve cipher telegrams, four regular telegrams, and ten signed
statements secured at the end of pre-trial interrogatories, plus "several"
other documents. Exceeding in importance all other aspects of evidencegathering was a paramount fact attesting to the incontrovertible nature of
that evidence. Namely, each and every one of these documents was
legalized by competent officials of the Justice and Interior Ministries who
then appended on these documents the verification formula "it conforms to
the original." In other words, as in Nuremberg, so in Istanbul, nearly every
document was authenticated before being introduced as evidence-in-chief.
In several sittings of the courts martial, the unexpected production of such
documents not only surprised many defendants playing the game of routine
denials, but compelled them to reverse themselves, and admit guilt.
For example, in the Yozgat trial series at the 9 th sitting (February 22,
1919), Colonel Sahabeddin, Commander of Kayseri's 15' h Division and

14. Vahakn N. Dadrian, The Documentation of the World War I Armenian Massacres in the
Proceedingsof the Turkish Military Tribunal, 23 INT'L J. OF MIDDLE EAST STUDIES 4, 552-53
(1991).
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area military commander, kept denying his knowledge of the massacre of
several hundred Armenians of a particular deportee convoy. When the
Chief Judge surprised him, however, by producing ciphers with his
signature on it, he fainted and had to be excused temporarily.15 There were
several series of trials that culminated in death verdicts for both defendants
who were present, as well as for others in absentia. Another significant
feature of these trials was that, contrary to court-martial tradition, these
trials were open to the public and defense counsel was allowed a role of
challenging witness and court jurisdiction. But even more significant,
witness testimony was almost entirely predicated upon Muslim testimony,
thereby deliberately underplaying the role of Armenian survivors'
testimony. 16
c.

JurisdictionalChallenge

Several defense lawyers raised a number of issues thereby challenging
both the competence of the courts and the legal-constitutional premises of
the charges and the ensuing verdicts. Foremost among these was the matter
of the constitutional legality of subjecting wartime Cabinet Ministers to
court-martial. Arguing that Article 31 of the Constitution provides for their
trial before the High Court, these counsel requested from the military court
to declare itself incompetent. Moreover, they argued that even if the
Military Court rejects this argument on the ground that these wartime
Cabinet Ministers are being court martialed not for offences in connection
with official duties but for non-official crimes such as murder and massacre,
the venue for such trials should not be court-martial, they counter-argued,
but ordinary criminal courts. The court rejected both these arguments. It
held that because of the imposition of martial law "civil and judicial laws
are entirely muted," i.e., inoperative (kavanini miilkiye ve adiye tamamile

sakin).17 In this instance, courts-martial became the only penal recourse
(merciiceraim). 8
E. THE THRUST OF VERDICTS
Unlike in the Nuremberg case, the Istanbul trials were entirely based
upon domestic penal codes rather than international law. Two aspects of the
series of these verdicts stand out in terms of their ramifications for the legal

15. See RENAISSANCE, Feb. 21, 1919.
16. Vahakn N. Dadrian, Genocide as a Problem of National and International Law: The
World War I Arnenian Case and its ContemporaryRamifications, 14 YALE J. INT'L L. 221, 296302 (1989).
17. Vahakn N. Dadrian, Genocide as a Problem of National and International Law: The
World War I Armenian Case and its ContemporaryRamifications, 14 YALE J. INT'L L. 221, 30405 (1989).
18. Id.
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definition of genocide and international criminal law as well. The Turkish
Military Tribunal citing authenticated documents declared that the crimes of
massacre and deportation committed against the Armenians were
premeditated. In the Key Indictment, for example, it states that Dr. Nazim,
one of the architects of the Armenian Genocide, is on record saying that the
measures applied against the Armenians were the result of "careful and
19 Furthermore, in the
prolonged deliberations" (ariz ve amik dii~iiniilerek).
20
2
Verdicts of Yozgat,
Trabzon, ' and Erzincan"2 the distinct word
"premeditation" (taammiiden) is used to characterize the crime of mass
murder against the Armenians. Accordingly the Court invoked Article 170
of the Penal Code that prescribes death for premeditation. The other and
perhaps even more critical aspect is the issue of intent. In the Harput
Verdict there is an allusion to "deportation" which, most significantly, is
stated by one of the arch-perpetrators to mean "extermination" (imha)."3
However, the most pungent and explicit confirmation of the genocidal
intent of the wartime deportations comes from an authority renowned for
"straight" and unambiguous talk. The reference is to General Mehmet
Vehip, wartime Commander-in-Chief of the 3rd Army in eastern Turkey
where the Armenian population was the heaviest, most concentrated, and
genocidal operations most sweeping. In his authoritative and written
testimony, provided to the Military Tribunal, Vehip, with emphasis,
declared:
The deportation and massacres of the Armenians was carried out in
a manner absolutely inimical with (the ideals of) humanity,
civilization, and the honor of the government. The massacre and
extermination of the Armenians (katl ve imha) was the result of the
decision of the Central Committee of CUP .... This crime was

based upon a decision and a program (mukarrer bir program), and
a definite intent (mutlak bir kast tahtnda)... The entire program
was carried out through oral orders and instructions ( ifahi evamir
ve talimat) and as a result no written proof or documents are left
behind. 4

19. Takvimi Vekdyi [Ottoman Parl.Official R. Suppl. covering the proceedings of the courtsmartial],No. 3540, 8 (1919).
20. Id. at No. 3617, p. 2.
21. Id. at No. 3616, p. 3 .
22. Id. at No. 3917, p. S.
23. Id. at No. 3772, p. 5.
24. Ani, Feb. 20, 1919 (containing full testimony); see also MUAMMER DEMIREL, BIRINCI
DUNYA

HARBINDE

ERZURUM

(containing abridged testimony).

VE

(;EVRESINDE ERMENIHAREKETLERI

1914-1918,

53-4
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F. CONCLUSION

In summary, it may be stated that before the factors of tractable power
relations and shifting political currents could set in, defeated Turkey, just
like defeated Germany in the wake of World War II, was not only prepared,
but was even eager to recognize fully the reality of the Armenian Genocide
and to deal with it through a massive undertaking of retributive justice. It is
a fact that the proceedings of the Turkish Military Tribunal were not fully
completed and many of its verdicts expediently were nullified by the
successor Kemalist regime. Superseding this fact, however, is the massive
documentary evidence generated and frequently used in the course of the
trials. The compelling nature of that evidence provides a solid measure of
validity for the trial records, while attesting to the lasting character of the
facts of the Armenian Genocide. These facts are summed up by Henry
Morgenthau, the wartime American ambassador to Turkey, as "the murder
of a Nation"." British historian, Arnold Toynbee, who was deeply involved
in the documentation of the crimes, labelled it as "the gigantic crime."2 6

II. THE ARMENIAN GENOCIDE AS A PROBLEM OF
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW
A. INTRODUCTION

Part I of this study examined the domestic law aspects of the World
War I Armenian Genocide, which call for further depiction. First, the
constitutive elements of the crime of genocide were treated as an integral
part of any domestic legal system. Taken separately, each of the crimes
involved-such as murder, extermination, and forced deportation-are
offenses proscribed by nearly every system of domestic penal law. Second,
given the ample evidence of the criminal prosecution of the Armenian
Genocide through a series of courts martial in post-war Turkey, the
Armenian Genocide may well be considered as a settled matter in terms of
both fact and guilt.
Also referenced in Part I was the link between domestic penal law and
international criminal law in terms of the principle of crimes against
humanity. This linkage was articulated by Sir Hartley Shawcross, the
British Chief Prosecutor at Nuremberg, with reference to the general
principle of crimes against humanity. In fact, that reference involved a
specific condemnation of the massacres committed against the Armenians
in the last decade of the nineteenth century, the antecedents of the wartime

25.
26.

HENRY MORGENTHAU, AMBASSADOR MORGENTHAU'S STORY 301 (1918).
JAMES BRYCE & ARNOLD TOYNBEE, THE TREATMENT OF ARMENIANS IN THE

OTTOMAN 1915-1916, 649 (Ara Sarafian ed., Princeton 2000).
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Shawcross denounced these crimes as "cruel persecution,"
genocide."
stating that "the right of humanitarian intervention is not a novelty in
International Law. 28 He explained the ensuing intervention on behalf of
the Armenian victims as follows:
[n]ormally International Law concedes that it is for the State to
decide how it shall treat its own nationals, it is a matter of domestic
jurisdiction... Yet International Law has in the past made some
claim that there is a limit to the omnipotence of the State and that
the individual human being, the ultimate unit of all law, is not
disentitled to the protection of mankind when the state tramples
upon his rights in the manner which outrages the conscience of
mankind.2 9
As noted in Part I, it is equally significant that when initiating criminal
proceedings against the perpetrators of the Armenian Genocide, several
authoritative figures including the Sultan-the supreme authority of the
Ottoman Empire-parliamentarians, and court martial judges repeatedly
referred to it as "a crime against humanity" when initiating criminal
proceedings against the perpetrators. The significance of this cannot be
sufficiently emphasized. It epitomizes the pre-existing roots of the postWorld War II adoption and codification of the legal term "crimes against
humanity."
These roots came to legal prominence on May 24, 1915. The Allies
(Great Britain, France, and Russia) jointly warned Ottoman Turkey about
the criminal consequences connected to the ongoing, wartime massacres of
the Armenians.3 In doing so, they introduced the term "crimes against
humanity."3 Equally significant, this norm of "crimes against humanity,"
promulgated by the victorious Allies in connection with the wartime
Armenian massacres, was embedded as a matter of precedent in Article 6(c)
of the Nuremberg Charter and Article 5(c) of the Tokyo Charter.32
Moreover, Article II of the Control Council Law no. 10, which applied to
occupied Germany, includes "crimes against humanity" as a basis for
prosecution of individual Nazis. 3

27. VAHAKN N. DADRIAN, THE HISTORY OF THE ARMENIAN GENOCIDE: ETHNIC CONFLICT
FROM THE BALKANS TO ANATOLIA TO THE CAUCASUS 415 (Berghahn Books 2004) (1995).

28. Id.
29. HER MAJESTY'S STATIONARY OFFICE, SPEECHES OF THE CHIEF PROSECUTORS AT THE
CLOSE OF THE CASE AGAINST THE INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS, 1946, Cmd. 6964, at 63.

30.
World
(1989).
31.
32.

Vahakn N. Dadrian, Genocide as a Problem of National and InternationalLaw: The
War I Armenian Case and its Contemporary Ramifications, 14 YALE J. INT'L L. 221, 262
Id.at221-334.
U.N. WAR TIMES COMMISSION, HISTORY OF THE UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES

COMMISSION AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAWS OF WAR 34, 45 (1948).

33.

Id. at 36.
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Likewise the Commission of 15, i.e., the Sub-Commission II on the
Responsibility for the Violation of the Laws and Customs of War, in its
final report of March 29, 1919, made a reference to the "customs of war,
laws of humanity, and clear dictates of humanity."3
In doing so, it
embraced the so-called "Martens Clause" that had become part of the
Preamble of the 1907 Hague Convention IVY The Martens Clause, for the
first time, formally applied the principle of the "laws of humanity" to
civilian populations caught in the vortex of warfare.36
B.

THE NUREMBERG LEGACY

As indicated above, the adoption at Nuremberg of the new criminal
code relating to crimes against humanity is directly traceable to the
genocidal, wartime persecution of the Armenians and to the related
response of the victorious Allies. Closely associated with this innovation
was the discarding of a traditional legal defence against criminal liability.
Namely, heads of state were no longer immune from prosecution on
account of constitutional guarantees of inviolability.3 7 The international
norm "act of state" was declared invalid.38 By the same token, the legal
defences of "superior orders" and "mandatory obedience"-used by
subordinates-were likewise discarded.3 9 The Nuremberg trials managed to
introduce and legally enshrine the principle of "individual responsibility"
under any and all circumstances, in wartime, as well as in times of peace. n
These aforementioned legal defences were offered by Ottoman-Turkish for
the mass murder perpetrated under color of state law-as seen in the May
14/27, 1915 Temporary Law of Deportation- but were divested of their
legal validity.4 '
C. THE UNITED NATIONS LEVERAGE
Before the United Nations involved itself in the arena of international
criminal law by promulgating the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, it issued twin resolutions on the
34. VIOLATIONS OF THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF WAR 58-79 (Paris Peace Conference
ed.1919).
35. Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague II), July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1803, 1 Bevans

247 [hereinafter Hague I1].
36. Id.
37. Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the
European Axis and the Charter of the International Military Tribunal, art. 7, Aug. 8, 1945, 82
U.N.T.S. 280.
38. Id.atart. 8.

39. Id.
40. 22 INT'L MILITARY TRIBUNAL 413; see also R.H. JACKSON, THE NUREMBERG CASE 88
(2d ed. 1971) (1947).
41. M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 540-41
(2d rev. ed. 1999).
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issue of genocide. Resolution 95(1) of December 11, 1946 stated that the
General Assembly "affirms the principles of international law recognized
by the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and the judgment of the
Tribunal. 42 In Resolution of 96(1) of the same date, the General Assembly
asserted,
that genocide is a crime under international law, which the civilized
world condemns, and for the commission of which principals and
accomplices- whether private individuals, public officials, or
statesmen, and whether the crime is committed on religious, racial,
political, or other grounds are punishable.43
On December 9, 1948, the General Assembly of the United Nations
adopted the Convention on Genocide. 44 It entered into force on January 12,
195 1.4 It is evident that the Genocide Convention does not purport to
create a new crime. In the Preamble, the Genocide Convention recognizes
"that at all periods of history genocide has inflicted great losses on
humanity. '46 Article I states that "[t]he contracting Parties confirm that
genocide, whether committed in time of peace or in time of war, is a crime
under international law. ' 47 The absence of a reference to a time frame
(ratione temporis) as a condition for establishing liability for the
commission of genocide is notable here. The Convention is not only
prospective in its thrust, but it is, at least implicitly, retroactive as well, as
Articles V and VI provide an opportunity for States to enact appropriately
redesigned criminal codes and related procedures to prosecute crimes under
the Convention.4 8 On the other hand, Article VIII confers jurisdiction upon
the International Court of Justice (ICJ) over matters covered by the terms of
the Genocide Convention, including the liability of a State for the crime of
genocide.49
D. THE ISSUE OF RETROACTIVITY
Paragraph 2 of Article 11 of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, December 11, 1940, prohibited ex-post facto sanctions for offenses
42. Affirmation of the Principles of International Law Recognized by the Charter of the
Nurmberg Tribunal, G.A. Res. 95(1), U.N. Doc. A/236 (Dec. 11, 1946).
43. U.N. GOAR, 1st Sess., 55th plen. mtg. U.N. Doc. A/64/Add.1 (Dec. 11, 1946).
44. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948,
102 Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 [hereinafter Genocide Convention].
45. Id.The relevant part of Article 9 of that U.N. Convention reads: "Disputes between the
Contracting Parties... shall be submitted to the ICJ at the request of any of the parties to the
dispute." The ICJ's jurisidiction is warranted by the fact that both Turkey and Armenia have
signed this Convention on July 31, 1950 and July 23, 1993, respectively, without reservations. See
WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 566 (2000).
46.

Genocide Convention, supra note 44.

47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
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falling under international law.5" However, Article 28 of the Vienna
Conventions on the Law of Treaties provides as follows:
[u]nless a different intention appears from the treaty or is otherwise
established, its provisions do not bind a party in relation to any act
or fact which took place or any situation which ceased to exist
before the date of entry into force of the treaty with respect to that
5
party. '
Moreover, retroactivity has been resorted to in several instances in
international law, especially with respect to aggression and crimes against
peace. The Genocide Convention is in this category because it codified preexisting international law, or at least underlying principles of international
law, such as the Martens Clause. 2
This codification of international law can be seen in a revealing and
detailed article by renowned international law expert M. Cherif Bassiouni.
Bassiouni relates how, in an effort to deal with the problem of retroactivity,
he researched and discovered a host of pre-existing components of the
crime of genocide.53 The London Agreement of August 8, 1945 (i.e., the
Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal),5 4 the Convention on the NonApplicability of the Statutory Limitations to the War Crimes and Crimes
Against Humanity of 1968, 55 and the Vienna Convention of 1969 on the
Law of Treaties also demonstrate the codification argument.56 As a matter
of fact, as stated above, the Genocide Convention does not stipulate or
prohibit retroactive application. This is in contrast with the 1998 Statute of
the International Criminal Court, which explicitly prohibits retroactive
application of its clauses.57
Even though the principle of crimes against humanity is not
encompassed by the term "genocide," the reverse is also true. Remarkably,
the Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War

50. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc A/810 at 71
(1948).
51. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 333
[hereinafter Vienna Convention].
52. Hague II, supra note 35.
53. M. Cherif Bassiouni, Bearing Witness, in PIONEERS IN GENOCIDE STuDIES 315-63

(Samuel Totten & Steven L. Jacobs eds., Transaction Publishers 2002).
54. Charter of the International Military Tribunal Annexed to the London Agreement for the
Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, 59
Stat. 1546, 82 U.N.T.S. 280.
55. Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes
Against Humanity, Nov. 11, 1970, 754 U.N.T.S. 73, reprinted in BASSIOUNI, supra note 41
[hereinafter Non-Applicability Convention].

56. Vienna Convention, supra note 51.
57. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, adopted by the U.N. Diplomatic
Conference of Plenipotentiatics on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court on 17
July 1998, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9 (1998) 37 I.L.M. 999.
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Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity, in force since November 11, 1970,
clearly and deliberately asserted its retroactive applicability. 8 Article I(b)
reads:
No statutory limitation shall apply to the following crimes
irrespective of the date of their commission. Crimes against
humanity whether committed in time of war or in time of peace...
and the crime of genocide as defined in the 1948 Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, even if, such
acts do not constitute a violation of the domestic law of the country
in which they are committed. 9
Further, on this issue of retroactivity, the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR, in paragraph 1 of Article 15, restates the
Latin dictum nullum crimen sine lege, nulla poena sine lege praevia (no
crime without pre-existing law, hence no punishment)." However, this is
conditional in the sense that,
[n]othing in this Article shall prejudice the trial and punishment of
any person for any act or omission which, at the time when it was
committed, was criminal according to the general principles of law
recognized by the community of nations.6
The reference in the latter part of the paragraph to general principles of law
is significant. It is equally significant that Turkey ratified the ICCPR in
September 2003, and it entered into force in December 2003.62
E. THE LEGAL CHALLENGE OF THE EICHMANN CASE
The adjudication of Israel v. Eichman by the Israeli criminal justice
system was novel in that it drew on Article I of the United Nations
Genocide Convention to the detriment of Article VI. Article VI is futureoriented.6 3 Article I, on the other hand, outlines the general principle that
the rules of customary international law are binding on States. 64 Pursuing
this line of argumentation, the Supreme Court of Israel upheld the position
of Israel's District Court of Law relative to the customary law aspect of the
crime of genocide. 65 As argued by Israel, the prosecution of Eichmann did
58.

Non-Applicability Convention, supranote 55.

59. Id.
60. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. XV, 1 1, open for signature
Dec. 19,1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR].
61. Id.
62. Alfred de Zayas, The Genocide against the Armenians, 1915-1923, and Relevance of the
1948 Genocide Convention, EUR. ARM. FOUND. FOR JUSTICE AND DEMOCRACY 27 (2005)
availableat http://eafjd.eu/1MG/pdf/dezayasreport.pdf.
63. Genocide Convention, supra note 44.
64. Id.
65. See Attorney-General of Israel v. Adolf Eichmann, District Court of Jerusalem, Judgment
of December 11, 1961, 56 AM. J. INT'L L. 805 (1962) [hereinafter Eichmann].
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not rest on a legislative act contravening the principle of "no penalty
without previous law," but on an act whereby the Israeli parliament codified
international law.66 This kind of reasoning is in line with the assertion that

the Nuremberg Charter did not enact new law but rather declared the
existing international law; hence, it could be viewed as retroactive. The
Israeli Court relied on the principle that crimes against humanity are
violations of the law of nations and hence are subject to universal
jurisdiction. Thus, the crimes in question were not only crimes under
Israeli law, but were at the same time, grave offenses against the law of
nations (delictajurisgentium).67

To sum up, by way of rendering inoperative the code on statutory
limitations, genocide and its twin appendage, crimes against humanity, are
now recognized as part of customary international law. Retroactivity is
thus transposed to the level of norms and principles of international
jurisdiction.
F.

THE LEGAL PRINCIPLE OF STATE SUCCESSION

The cardinal question is this. Is the modem Republic of Turkey in any
way responsible for the crime of the Armenian Genocide? The answer
largely hinges on the issue of successor states. Under international law, the
modem Republic of Turkey is heir and successor to the Ottoman Empire.
Thus, the Republic of Turkey acquires all the rights of the Empire, while at
the same time incurring all its liabilities. For example, when the matter of
apportioning of the Ottoman Empire's debt was being handled in 1952,
Arbitrator Borel determined that Turkey continued the personality of the
former Ottoman Empire.68
The Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of State
Property, Archives and Debts, declares that a succession of states does not,
as such, "affect the rights and obligations of creditors."69 This principle was
formulated, inter alia, by the Permanent Court of Arbitration in the
Lighthouse Arbitration case.7" The Court held that Greece was the successor
state even though the charge was against the autonomous state of Crete.7
In Kolovrat v. Oregon, the United States Supreme Court considered
whether Yugoslavia was the successor state to Serbia or an entirely new
entity.72 The court held that Yugoslavia continued the personality of Serbia

66. ICCPR, supra note 60, at art. XV, 1.
67. Eichmann, supra note 65, at 38.
68. Ottoman Debt Administration, 1 R.I.A.A. 529 (1925).
69. Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of State Property, Archives, and
Debts art. 36, Apr. 7, 1983, 22 I.L.M. 306.
70. The Lighthouses Arbitration (Fr. v. Greece) 23 I.L.R. 659 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1956).
71. Id.
72. 366 U.S. 187 (1961).
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and thus the Serbian treaty of 1881 was binding on Yugoslavia.73 In 1993,
the ICJ refused the argument of the Yugoslav state that as a new
governmental entity it was not to be confounded with former Yugoslavia
under Milosevic, and hence it was not responsible for the latter's actions,
which had led to the filing of the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina against
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.74
Even though the Ottoman Empire collapsed at the end of World War I
and the Sultan's reign had ended, the Turkish Republic, as successor state,
assumed sovereignty over the former Ottoman lands. Not being a new
state, the Republic of Turkey was not free of the legal obligations incurred
by her predecessor, the Ottoman Empire."
The practice of systematically disclaiming any legal connection to the
Ottoman Empire relative to its legal and other obligations is in stark
contrast, to the indulgent and recurrent avowals of the glories of Ottoman
heritage by many contemporary Turkish public figures and authors. This
practice is in stark contrast with the position of the first Foreign Minister of
the emerging Turkish Republic, Dr. Ahmet Muhtar. Namely, on December
20, 1920, Dr. Muhtar declared to the Turkish parliament that a change of
regime does not change or cancel the existing legal principles involved in
international agreements and pacts; in fact, he argued that "it cannot
change."76 Eight decades later, in 1999, Istemihan Talay, the Minister of
Culture, declared, "[t]he Republic of Turkey is the continuation of the
Ottoman Empire whose legacy is part of our history."7 7 In an essay, the
veteran Turkish diplomat-historian, Kamuran Glrfin, declared, "[t]he
Turkish Republic is the continuation of the Ottoman Empire .... The
continuity involves the nation, the people."78 Turkish scholar Ahmet Insel
stated in a French newspaper article that, according to certain protagonists,
"the continuity of the state" was enshrined in the Treaty of Lausanne,
especially with respect to the external debt of the Empire.7 9 A retired
Turkish ambassador declared, "[t]he Turkish Republic is the heir of the

73. Id.
74. The Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (Bosnia v. Serbia) 2007 I.C.J. 91 (Feb. 26).
75. Alfred de Zayas, The Twentieth Century's First Genocide: InternationalLaw, Impunity,
the Right to Reparations, and the Ethnic Cleansing Against the Armenians, 1915-16, in ETHNIC
CLEANSING IN20TH CENTURY EUROPE 171-72 (S.B. Vardy & T. Hunt Tooley eds. 2003). Prof.
de Zayas is the principal source of many of the descriptions and comments offered in this part of
the article.
76. T.B.M.M. Gizli Celse Zabitlar [The Transcripts of the Secret Proceedings of the Grand
National Assembly] Apr. 24, 1920-Feb. 21, 1921. Vol. 1. Ankara, 1985, p. 247, left column.
77. TORXIYE (Turkish daily in Istanbul), Mar. 1, 1999.
78. Kamuran Grtirn, Tkirkiye-Ermenistan Ili kilcri [Turkish-Armenian Relations], 3
AVRASYA ETODLERI 56 (1996).
79. Ahmet Insel, LIBERATION (Fr.), Feb. 5,2001.
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Ottoman Empire." 8' Hugh Poulton, a Western author, estimated that 85
percent of the Ottoman Empire's civil servants and 93 percent of its staff
officers retained their positions in the new republic, thus attesting to the
state's continuity.8 ' Finally, reference may be made to Atatfirk, co-founder
of the Republic.8"
Speaking in general about the problem of the settlement of accounts
that accumulated during the past centuries, Atatfirk said, "[i]t was our duty
to bear the responsibility for them before the world."8 3 It may be
appropriate to end this segment with the following observation of
Bassiouni:"[i]n international law, the doctrine of legal continuity and
principles of State responsibility make a successor government liable in
respect of claims arising from a former government's violations."84
The massive procedures of German atonement and reparations to the
new state of Israel were decisively influenced by the initiative of Konrad
Adenauer, Chancellor of West Germany in 1949, and re-elected to that post
three more times, in 1953, 1957, and 1961.5 A lawyer by profession,
Chancellor Adenauer provided the following rationale for this initiative, as
reported in the March 13, 1955 issue of Paris-Match:
The crimes were committed by the [Nazi] regime... whose
establishment was favoured or tolerated by the unforgivable
blindness of one section of this people. That is why the German
people as a whole is responsible. They ought to be made conscious
of this responsibility. It is ... the duty of each one to repair and to
expiate.86
G. THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION REVISITED
In a recent development, the International Center for Transitional
Justice in New York produced a legal brief in which the Armenian
Genocide is examined in terms of its relevance and significance for the
United Nations Genocide Convention.87 After some meticulous research,
the International Center for Transitional Justice concluded that the events
80.

Pulat Tacar, Ermenilere Soykirim Yaptldiki Savnin Hukuksal ve Ahlaki Agdardan

Incelenmesi, 2 ERMENI ARA$TRMALAR 94 (2001) (Turk.).
81.

HUGH POULTON, TOP HAT, GREY WOLF AND CRESCENT 88 (1997).

82.

Id.

83.

PATRICK BALFOUR KINROSS, ATATURK: A BIOGRAPHY OF MUSTAFA KEMAL, FATHER

OF MODERN TURKEY 418 (1965).
84. United Nations Commission on Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN/4/1999/65.
85. See generally CHARLES WILLIAMS, ADENAUER: THE FATHER OF THE NEW GERMNAY
(John Waley & Sons, 2000).

86.

Konrad Adenauer, PARIS-MATCH, Mar. 13, 1955, at 87.

87.

Applicability of the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the

Crime of Genocide to Events which Occurred During the Early Twentieth Century, International
Center for Transitional Justice (February 10, 2003) available at http://www.armeniangenocide.org/files/ICTJMemorandum.pdf.
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comprising the wartime treatment of the Armenians "viewed collectively,
can thus be said to include all of the elements of the crime of genocide as
defined in the [United Nations] Convention on Genocide and legal scholars
as well as historians, politicians, journalists and other people would be
justified in continuing to so describe them.""8
The key criterion in the United Nations Convention on Genocide's
definition of the crime of genocide is the intent of the perpetrators.8 9 The
proceedings of the Turkish Military Tribunal emphasised this matter. 9°
Several verdicts of the courts martial underscored the twin factors of
premeditation and genocidal intent as key characteristics of the centrally
organized mass murder of Armenians. 91 In the proceedings of the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (July 5, 2001),
several variations of intent were specified including special intent,
particular intent, specific intent, and genocidal intent. 92 As the prosecutor
argued proof of specific intent, may, in the absence of direct, explicit
evidence, be inferred from an array of facts and circumstances, such as the
general context, the perpetration of other culpable acts systematically
directed against the same victim group, the scale of atrocities committed,
the systematic targeting of victims on account of their membership of a
particular group, and the repetition of destructive and discriminatory acts. 93
There is need here to distinguish specific intent from motive. The
prosecution explained that the existence of a motive other than genocide
does not preclude the perpetrator from also having the specific intent to
commit genocide.94 For example, the motive of a quest for economic gain
may instigate the crime of genocidal murder. Understood thusly, motive
emerges as a drive that is general in its thrust toward action, whereas intent
is both goal-specific and goal-directed. The respective state of mind is
clear, and the associated act is focused narrowly and decisively. In other
words, both a specific target and a definite intent "to destroy in whole or in
part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group as such" is involved. 95
The Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda stated, "it
is possible to infer the genocidal intention. . . inter alia, from all acts or
utterances of the accused or from the general context in which other
88. Memorandum from the Int'l Ctr. for Transitional Justice on the Applicability of the
United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide to Events
which Occurred During the Early Twentieth Century to the Turkish Armenian Reconciliation
Comm'n 17 (Feb. 10, 2003).
89. Genocide Convention, supra note 44.
90. See Takvimi Vekdyi, supra note 19.
91. Id. at no. 3616, p.3; no. 3617, p.2; and no. 3617, p. 5 .
92. Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Trial Judgment, T 497 (Sept. 2, 1998)

[hereinafter Akayesu].
93. Id.
94. Id. at T 477.
95. Id. at T 497.
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culpable acts were perpetrated systematically against the same

group."96

The international law aspects of the Armenian Genocide, embracing the
condition of intent in the process, have been most prominently expounded
by Bassiouni in a series of articles and books on international law. These
writings deserve depiction and emphasis. For example, referring to the
May 24, 1915 declaration of the Allies, Bassiouni wrote, "This was the first
time that crimes against humanity were given a substantive meaning which
placed criminal responsibility on individuals as well as states, whether in
time of war or peace."97 In another piece, he wrote about "the Allies' failure
to pursue the killing" of the Armenians; he bemoaned how the notion of
"crimes against humanity" became "a legal reality," but these "atrocities,
now commonly referred to as genocide, remained unpunished."98 "The
reluctance to recognize [these crimes] as prosecutable and punishable
international crimes came back to haunt the very same Allies, and
particularly the United States, after World War II."" In 1998, Bassiouni
discussed the promulgation of the new Code of Crimes Against Humanity
In his massive
as it was applied to the case of the Armenian Genocide.'
international criminal law treatise, Bassiouni extensively tackles the
problems surrounding the Armenian Genocide.' 0 '
Mention should be made of William Schabas, another international law
expert, who treats the Armenian Genocide in the same vein.0 2 With some
detail, William Schabas examines the many aspects of the usage of the
terms, "intent," "specific intent," and "premeditation" as those aspects
preoccupied several of the United Nations' bodies tasked with defining
these terms.'013 Noteworthy in this respect are the following two excerpts
from the related proceedings. The International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda declared:
[sipecial intent.., a well-known criminal law concept in the
Roman-continental legal systems ... is required as a constituent

element of certain offenses and demands that the perpetrator have
the clear intent to cause the offense charged ... [there is to be] a

psychological relationship between the physical result and the

96. Id.
97. M. Cherif Bassiouni, InternationalLaw and the Holocaust, 9 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 201,
210 (1979).
98. M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Time has Come for an International Criminal Court 1 IND.
INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 1, 2-4 (1991).
99. Id.
100. M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Normative Framework of International Humanitarian Law:
Overlaps, Gaps and Ambiguities, 8 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 199, 204 (1998).
101. BASSIOUNI, supra note 41, at 169, 175, 176, 541.
102. SCHABAS,supra note 45, at 17-21.
103. Id.
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mental state of the perpetrator."o
Furthermore, the International Law Commission focused on specific intent
in genocide in its comments on the 1996 Code of Crimes against the Peace
and Security of Mankind. It declared:
a general intent to commit one of the enumerated acts combined
with a general awareness of the probable consequences of such an
act with respect to the immediate victim or victims is not sufficient
for the crime of genocide. The definition of this crime requires a
particular state of mind or a specific intent with respect to the
overall consequences of the prohibited act.'0
It should be parenthetically stated that, given the cataclysmic nature of
genocide, no victim population can escape its horrendous economic
dimensions. In fact, in the two major genocides of the twentieth centurythe Armenian and the Jewish-massive transfers of wealth from the victim
population to the perpetrators' camps have been paramount. 106
The somewhat detailed exploration of the element of intent, embedded
in the legal framework that defines genocide, is an integral part of the key
argument that the fate inflicted upon the bulk of the Armenian population of
Turkey was genocidal in the strictest meaning of that term. The Armenian
Genocide was planned, organized and executed by the highest authorities
and power-wielders of the state." 7 The perpetrating regime used all
available means to maintain utmost secrecy, including the optimal
engagement of its informal network of select and high-ranking party
functionaries.'0 8 Nevertheless, the regime could not ultimately avoid
occasionally and inadvertently betraying the top-secret scheme of genocide.
The three documents cited below came from the two most powerful
organizers of the genocide in question. Common to all three is their
104.

Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Sentencing Judgment,

516

(Sept. 2, 1998).
105.
106.

SCHABAS,Supra note 45, at218-19n.103.
With reference to the Armenian case, Veteran US Consul at Aleppo, Jesse B. Jackson,

informed Washington that the wholesale extermination of the Armenians entailed "a gigantic
plundering scheme."

Letter from J.B. Jackson, American Consul at Aleppo, Syria, to Henry

Morgenthau, American Ambassador to Constantinople (Aug. 19, 1915) (on file at U.S. National
Archives, RG59.867.4016/148). See also KEvORK BAGHDJIAN, LA CONFISCATION PAR LE

GOUVERNEMENT TURC DES BIENS ARMtNIENS (Montreal 1987).
It is generally accepted international law that the obligation of States to make restitution for
properties gained by resort to genocide does not lapse with time. Both de Zayas and Bassiouni
concur on this, with the latter declaring specifically that "there can be no doubt that their [the
Armenians'] claim for reparations continues to exist and that this claim should continue to exist
for their heirs." Interview with Correspondent, France-Armdnie (Nov. 2001) (discussing genocide
and reparations).
107. ULRICH TRUMPENER, GERMANY AND THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 1914-1918,203 (1968).

108. Vahakn N. Dadrian, The Convergent Roles of the State and a Governmental Party in the
Armenian Genocide, in STUDIES IN COMPARATIVE GENOCIDE 116-17 (Levon Chorbajian &
George Shirinian eds., St. Martin's Press 1999).
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expression of an explicit intent to destroy the victim population by using
such terms as "radical solution," "liquidation," "destruction" and "decisive
solution of the Armenian question."10 9
When formally announcing the decision to deport the Armenians en
masse, Interior Minister Mehmet Talat prepared a memorandum laying out
the reasons for, and objectives of, that radical decision. 10 Before the
cabinet could consider and debate that decision, as required by law, Interior
Minister Mehmet Talat impelled - if not compelled - the rather submissive
Grand Vizier (who was actually superior to him in rank) to hastily approve
and sign it."' That rather lengthy state document contains a passage which
most Turkish historians, including Hikmet Bayur, in his time the doyen of
Turkish historians, chose to delete when reproducing it in their respective
works." 2 Without mincing words, this architect of the Armenian Genocide
sets forth the principal objective of the planned mass deportation of the
Armenians." 3 The decision to deport the Armenians, Talat declared, is
meant to "fundamentally solve and eliminate this bothersome trouble" (bu
gailenin esaslI bir suretde hal ve fash ile kiilliyen izalesi)."4 About one
year later, when the genocide operations were in high gear, Talat gloatingly
declared to a confidant that, through the scheme of deportations, "the
Armenian question has been decisively solved" (Ermeni meselesinin sureti
katiyede hall)).5
Finally, reference may be made to a Turkish court-martial document
released in 1919 in which Dr. Bahalddin $akir, the supreme taskmaster
organizing the actual genocidal field operations in the Anatolian provinces,
is quoted from one of his top-secret cipher telegrams." 6 In the telegram, he
orders one of his party commissars who was in charge of the province of
Harput, to subject the deportee convoys to operations aimed at "liquidating"
(tasfiye) and ultimately "destroying" (imha) the Armenian deporteesrather than just "deporting" (sevk) them."'

III. CONCLUSION
Despite persistent denials"' put forth in the last eight decades by a
109. AT1 (Turk.), Feb. 24, 1920.
110. Id.

111.

Id.

112. Id.See also Y.H. BAYUR, 3 TOR INKILABI TARIHI, 40-41 (1957).
113. Id.
114. AT (Turk.), Feb. 24, 1920.
DONDAR, MODERN TORKiYE'NiN $IFRES1 308-09 (2008); Interior Ministry
115. FUAT
Archives, No. 54426, July 13, 1916.
116. TAKViMI VEKAYI (Turk.), June 21, 1915, No. 3540, at 6.
117. Id.
118. See e.g., Richard Falk, The Armenian Genocide in Official Turkish Records, 22 J.POL. &
MILITARY SOC. 1, 1 (1994);

Slowly, yet with increasing authoritativeness, the reality of the Turkish genocide
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succession of Turkish governments, the World War I Armenian Genocide
has been shown to be a prosecutable case of centrally organized mass
murder. The significance of that case is further accented by the fact that the
prosecution in question has dual tenets, namely, domestic penal law, on the
one hand, and international criminal law, on the other.
Given the unique nature of the crime involved, one recognizes the
organic linkages between the two penal systems. These linkages were
evidenced in the public declarations made before, during and after the
courts-martial by the highest authorities of the Ottoman Empire denouncing
the crimes as offences that were seen as transcending national domains of
justice and encompassing, instead, mankind at large.
By a remarkable coincidence, legal authorities prosecuting Nazi crimes
in World War II at Nuremberg likewise depicted the antecedent Armenian
massacres as grave violations of the laws of humanity. This became the
Nuremberg doctrine. A doctrine that crafted the legal norm of "crimes
against humanity" and identified the Armenian Genocide as the historical
nexus between domestic and international criminal law domains. This is
one avenue through which the legal norm "genocide" and "crimes against
humanity" are rendered interdependent and hence interchangeable. Because
the Genocide Convention is not time-specific in the matter of applicability
relative to punishment, the matter of exercising retroactivity under certain
conditions is not precluded from consideration. As to the key problem of
"intent," the following three legal facts attest to the genocidal character of
the wartime destruction of the bulk of the Armenian population of the
Ottoman Empire: (1) the opinions and judgments evidenced in the
precedential cases of former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, (2) the assessments
of some prominent experts of international criminal law, Bassiouni, de
Zayas and Schabas in particular, (3) and the proceedings and the series of
verdicts in the Turkish courts-martial series, especially those of Yozgat,
Trabzon and Erzincan, where the terms "premeditation" and "deliberate
intent" were used.
perpetrated against the Armenian people has come to be accepted as established,
incontrovertible fact. Such a process has overcome formidable obstacles, especially the
well-orchestrated, shameful, as yet ongoing campaign by the Turkish government to
impose silence by promoting a variety of co-opting devices, by disseminating various
falsifications of the historical record, and through cajolery and intimidation.
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suppression of archives, and bribing scholars.
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